Future of Me

Future of Me

Future of Me

Turning a black-box health scan into a report people could understand, and
a system that could keep up, all in 1.5 days.

Turning a black-box health scan into a report people could understand, and a system that could keep up, all in 1.5 days.

Turning a black-box health scan into a report people could understand, and
a system that could keep up, all in 1.5 days.

role

Lead Designer

Lead Designer

Focus

Report UX โ€ข Systems โ€ข Automation

Report UX โ€ข Systems โ€ข Automation

Timeline

~1.5 Days

~1.5 Days

Context

Live retail pilot

Live retail pilot

project-image
project-image

1500+

1500+

1500+

people scanned over one weekend

people scanned over one weekend

~ 15%+

~ 15%+

~ 15%+

of those scanned, bought recommended product

of those scanned, bought recommended product

~15 โ†’ 2-3min

~15 โ†’ 2-3min

~15 โ†’ 2-3min

report production time, after automation

report production time, after automation

โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€” The bet had two layers

The business was testing whether personalization could sell.

The business was testing whether personalization could sell.

Broadway, a high-end mall in Hyderabad, was hosting Deep Holistics' wellness kiosk: a quick scan of a shopper's skin, hair and body.

Would people pay for recommendations built around their unique health data, not generic categories like "oily skin"? And could that pull them toward the flagship full-body analysis?

The scan could produce the data. The problem was everything that came after. The machine generated a dense, clinical report packed with graphs, scientific terms and unexplained metrics. It was technically correct, but almost impossible for a customer to interpret.

And this wasn't a concept to polish over weeks. It had to go live in a working store over one weekend. A dashboard was out of scope. We had roughly 1.5 days.

problem 01

Make the data understandable.

A person standing in a store should grasp their result in minutes, not decode a clinical printout.

problem 02

Make it produceable, fast.

Fast enough that a live store with a queue could actually keep churning reports.

โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€” frame 01 decode

Before designing the report, I had to understand what the machine was saying.

Before designing the report, I had to understand what the machine was saying.

I came on expecting to design a report. But even our own design team couldn't confidently interpret the machine's output.

The face scan had eight panels with no explanation. The hair analysis had fields like "single follicle proportion" and "follicle double root ratio." Body composition reported metrics like SMM; some graphs had no axis at all.

So I stopped designing and decoded the source first.

I worked through a vendor walkthrough, cross-checked it against videos of the same scans, and mapped the machine's opaque terminology onto customer-relevant concerns. With the doctors, I decided which metrics actually mattered to a person receiving the report, rather than a specialist reading raw output.

Running new research would have been the obvious move; skipping it was the deliberate one. A month earlier I had run research for our flagship product, with real customers, colleagues and clinic visits. It had already surfaced the pattern: people understand the scan, not the report.

With only 1.5 days, repeating that research wouldn't have changed the design decision. The scarce time was better spent understanding the actual black box.

โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€” frame 02 REdesign

The problem wasn't too much information. It was too much interpretation.

The problem wasn't too much information. It was too much interpretation.

The raw report handed a customer a verdict and left them alone with it.

project-image
project-image

But the customer still had to work out: what does this measure? where does it apply? should I worry? what do I do about it? The science was right. The presentation was built for a machine, not for a person trying to understand their body.

โ€” principle

One concern per page.

One concern per page.

Every finding became a small, self-contained explanation. The result itself wasn't softened. "Poor" stayed "Poor." What changed was the framing around it. Instead of giving someone a number that might trigger anxiety, the report gave that number context and a constructive next step.

The goal wasn't to hide an uncomfortable result. It was to make the result understandable enough to act on.

โ€” directions before converging

project-image
project-image

That consistency mattered beyond aesthetics. Every report used the same mental model, a stable way to read results and compare them over time. The report grew past 20 pages, but each page asked the customer to hold less in their head.

โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€” frame 03 personalise

The report wasn't just a picture of the scan. It became the record of a human recommendation.

The report wasn't just a picture of the scan. It became the record of a human recommendation.

A rules sheet could map a scan result to a product. But a scan alone couldn't know whether that product actually suited the person. So the system started with a machine suggestion, and a wellness expert adjusted it in conversation, based on the customer's routine, suitability and circumstances. That final call was written back into the report.

Machine

Machine

Scan data

Scan data

System

System

Rules-based recommendation

Rules-based recommendation

HUman

HUman

Expert judgement in intake

Expert judgement in intake

Report

Report

Personalised recommendation

Personalised recommendation

The experience aimed to fit a recommendation to a person, not push a category, and the report was the persistent record of that call.

โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€” frame 04 systemize

Once the report became predictable, the design itself became an automation interface.

Once the report became predictable, the design itself became an automation interface.

The first reports were built manually. Each one took around 15 minutes. That worked for a few customers, not for a live store with hundreds waiting. A dashboard was the obvious long-term fix, but not before the pilot proved demand: we had no developer or testing time, and the vendor shipped only rendered PDFs, not raw data.

So the PDF had to stay. Could it behave more like a system? After building several by hand, I noticed something.

Every scan image landed in the same position in every report. That repetition changed how I looked at the layout.

If a position never changes, it isn't just layout anymore. It's an anchor.

I standardized those anchors. For every image I defined an X/Y position, a width and height, and a semantic frame name. The engineer built a plugin that read the frame name, matched the extracted scan image to its fixed coordinate, and dropped it into place.

The visual system, the coordinate map and the naming structure were mine, extended from the company's existing design language rather than invented from scratch.

That structure is what the automation could run on.

โ€” Result

Manual production

Manual production

~ 15min

~ 15min

per report

per report

automated production

automated production

2-3min

2-3min

per report

per report

Image extraction and placement took about 4โ€“5 seconds once automated; data population ran off the same coordinates. The risk sat in one place: pulling images out of a rendered PDF. So I scoped the bet to that step and kept manual entry ready as a fallback. When the machines finally arrived Friday night, the first test failed exactly there. We patched the plugin on the spot, and the system was ready for launch.

โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€” frame 05 Launch

The pilot proved something, and exposed something else.

The pilot proved something, and exposed something else.

The launch weekend was real demand, not a controlled design exercise.

friday evening

Machines were still arriving. The first automation test failed. We patched the plugin and retested.

saturday

Demand was strong. Report waits sat around five minutes. The scan cost โ‚น1,500 for three scans.

Saturday โ†’ Sunday

Demand kept climbing. The team raised the price โ‚น1,500 โ†’ โ‚น1,800 to slow it down. People kept buying at the higher price.

sunday

The system couldn't keep up. Waits stretched beyond an hour, and some reports weren't delivered until the next day.

The bottleneck had moved. The report itself was no longer the primary problem. The production system was.

An honest qualification: the 2 to 3 minutes was per-report production, not end-to-end time at launch scale. Generation was fast, but the full line still jammed under the queue at peak. That gap is exactly what Phase 3 closed.

โ€” PDF launched

project-image
project-image

โ€” measured what the pilot proved

Over the 3-4 March launch weekend:

1500+

1500+

1500+

people scanned over one weekend

people scanned over one weekend

~ 15%+

~ 15%+

~ 15%+

of those scanned, bought recommended product

of those scanned, bought recommended product

~15 โ†’ 2-3min

~15 โ†’ 2-3min

~15 โ†’ 2-3min

report production time, after automation

report production time, after automation

These figures are blended from payment records and on-ground counts: strong but estimated, not audited. Revenue lift and conversion into the flagship full-body analysis weren't tracked, so I don't claim them.

โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€” frame 06 phase 3

Once demand was proven, the product needed infrastructure, not another PDF.

Once demand was proven, the product needed infrastructure, not another PDF.

The pilot answered enough of the business question to justify investing further. The team later shipped a web dashboard.

login

login

Phone number

Phone number

backend

backend

Data extraction

Data extraction

output

output

Report generation

Report generation

No manual PDF handling. No WhatsApp sending. Scan-to-report finally came down to under ten minutes end-to-end. Earlier PDF customers were migrated, and the kiosk kept running.

We did not need to build the dashboard first. The lightweight system proved demand before anyone committed to the big build. The pilot wasn't the final system. It was the fastest system we could responsibly use to learn.

โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€” 06 What i learned

The system matters as much as the interface.

The system matters as much as the interface.

The visible product was a report. But the leverage wasn't only in the screens. It came from understanding the source data, deciding what a customer actually needed to see, standardizing the experience, and then making that structure usable by an automated system.

1.
1.

interface

made the data understandable.

2.
2.

system

made the interface scalable.

โ€”โ€”โ€”โ€” next what i'd build next

A recommendation to become a regimen.

A recommendation to become a regimen.

The report currently ends with a list of recommended products. Useful, but it doesn't fully answer "what do I actually do next?" The next version I'd build turns the recommendation into a routine:

Daily

2x / week

AM/PM

occasional

at night

occasional

at night

1x week

pre-workout

post hairwash

pre-workout

post hair wash

After workout

1x week

The goal isn't more products to remember. It's a plan someone can follow.

1.
1.

product imagery

Let customers recognize a recommended product instantly on the Broadway shelf.

2.
2.

Cart + home delivery

Close the loop from recommendation to purchase without leaving the report.

3.
3.

live stock availability

Show whether a recommended product is actually in stock at Broadway before the trip.

These were deliberately left out of the MVP: Broadway had no product-image repository, fulfillment capability or stock API to support them.